How Will the U.S. Midterm Elections Affect AI Computing Power?
The competition among major powers for AI computing power has entered a new phase where "policy leverage dominates production capacity." The US election is not a turning point in the race, but it is the most powerful variable in regulating computing power supply: export controls lock borders, chip subsidies support the domestic market, and state-level local governance controls the most crucial gate for short-term computing power deployment.
The market can easily fall into a simplistic binary judgment of "Democrats block, Republicans loosen," but the responsibilities, disagreements, and transmission paths of this policy chain are far more complex than imagined:
I. Federal Level: Export Controls + Chip Subsidies—The Bottom Line Remains Unchanged, but the Scope Fluctuates
1. Relationship Between Authority and Responsibility: The Department of Commerce is responsible for issuing detailed export control rules. Congress does not have the direct power to formulate control rules, but it can exert pressure through legislation, budgets, and hearings to force the executive branch to close loopholes and adjust boundaries. Both parties share a common goal of maintaining advanced computing power barriers; differences are a means, not an end.
1) Hawkish Faction Dominates: Focus on plugging loopholes in regulations—tightening scrutiny of US cloud platform leasing of computing power, full-chain chip tracking, raising export license thresholds, and blocking channels for chip resale, third-party transshipment, and remote overseas access to computing power.
2) Moderates in the Tech Sector Hold the Upper Hand: maintaining the existing regulatory framework with only minor tweaks to avoid extreme regulations that could severely damage the overseas revenues of domestic companies like Nvidia and Microsoft, and prevent a weakening of US investment in AI research and development.
2. Disagreements over CHIPS and Science Act subsidies: Both parties support expanding domestic advanced chip production capacity, but the conditions attached to it differ greatly.
1) Democratic Party: Subsidies are tied to constraints such as labor, environmental protection, and restrictions on overseas expansion;
2) Republican Party: Believing there are too many restrictions and that the process is inefficient, they advocate simplifying the provisions and providing subsidies solely to support capacity expansion; changes in control of Congress will affect the pace of funding and reviews, directly impacting the progress of domestic U.S. chip production capacity rollout.
II. State and Local Elections: The Most Critical Variable for Short-Term Computing Power Supply
Environmental impact assessments, land use, water supply, grid connection, and tax incentives for data centers largely fall under the jurisdiction of state and local governments. Elections in key computing states like Texas, Georgia, and Virginia can impact cloud vendors' expansion plans.
1) Democratic Progressives: They prioritize energy consumption, carbon emissions, water resources, and community pressures, and tend to raise the bar for environmental impact assessments and energy consumption reviews, tighten tax incentives, delay or shelve new computing power projects, and slow down the deployment of new computing power.
2) Republicans: Treat data centers as projects that attract investment, create jobs, and generate tax revenue; simplify approval processes, provide supporting power grids, and offer tax breaks to attract computing power clusters to the area.
Meanwhile, Democrats are more likely to push through legislation regulating large-scale models and computing power security, increasing compliance costs for businesses; Republicans favor market autonomy and oppose strong regulation.
III. Ripple Effects Along the Industrial Chain
1. Short term: Existing chips and existing computing power clusters are largely unaffected; policy risks are concentrated on incremental computing power. Increased uncertainty in regulation and approvals will lead cloud vendors to become more conservative in capital expenditures, intensifying competition and increasing price volatility in the high-end computing power leasing market.
2. Medium term: The threshold for building computing power in the United States is rising, and computing power capital is shifting outward. Singapore, the Middle East and other regions with friendly regulations and stable energy are taking over computing power investment, and computing power layout is becoming more diversified; the importance of policy licensing bottlenecks is increasing, and they are on par with chip production capacity bottlenecks.
3. Implications for China's AI Industry
1) In the short term: the model of relying on purchasing high-end chips from abroad and renting overseas computing power has poor stability;
2) In the long term: This will force the acceleration of the independent computing power route, including self-developed chips, high-speed interconnection, and cluster scheduling, while developing algorithm technologies such as model lightweighting and distillation to reduce dependence on ultra-high single-card computing power.
IV.Clarification of Three Common Misconceptions
1. Export controls will be changed immediately after the election: Controls fall under the executive branch, and Congress can only exert pressure. The Department of Commerce has a research and public consultation period for revising rules. Ballots do not directly become control documents, and there is a significant time lag.
2. Democrats = total lockdown, Republicans = total liberalization: Both parties share the same goal in the competition for AI computing power; the only difference lies in the severity of the regulatory tools.
3. Policies will shut down existing computing power assets: Most new regulations are not retroactive and mainly restrict the circulation of new projects and new chips. Existing computing power will generally not be forcibly shut down.
V. Summary
Votes are like the "accelerator" that regulates the expansion of computing power; they cannot reverse the main trend of competition among major powers in AI computing power.
1. Short term: Disruptions to market expectations, fluctuations in computing power rental fees and related company valuations;
2. Mid-term: Determines the pace of data center and computing cluster construction in the United States;
3. Long term: Promote the regional restructuring of global computing power and accelerate the construction of independent computing power supply chains in various countries.
The competition for AI computing power is no longer just a race of chips and engineering, but a comprehensive game involving energy, local governance, export controls, and industrial subsidies, with the strategic attributes of computing power continuing to grow.
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